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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 17-3406
_____________
MARINA LOPEZ-BONILLA;
F.F.F.-L. (MINOR CHILD),
Petitioners
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent
_____________
On Petition for Review of an Order
of the Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A208-380-773
Agency No. A208-380-774)
Immigration Judge: John B. Carle
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
July 12, 2018
Before: McKEE and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges. *
(Opinion filed: March 21, 2019)
_________
OPINION **
*

The Honorable Thomas I. Vanaskie a member of the merits panel retired from the Court
on January 1, 2019 after the submission date, but before the filing of the opinion. This
opinion is filed by a quorum of the panel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(d) and Third Circuit
I.O.P. Chapter 12.
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

**

1

_________

McKEE, Circuit Judge.
Marina Lopez-Bonilla and F.F.F.-L. (her minor child), natives of Honduras,
petition for review of a final order of removal entered against them by the Board of
Immigration Appeals. The BIA adopted and affirmed the Immigration Judge’s decision
denying their application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the
Convention Against Torture. For the reasons that follow, we will dismiss the petition for
review. 1
I.
To be granted asylum, one must prove that s/he is a “refugee” as defined in the
Immigration and Nationality Act. A refugee is there defined as one who: (1) is being
persecuted based on their “race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion;” and (2) can establish past persecution or a well-founded fear
of future persecution if returned to their country of nationality. 2 The applicant bears the
burden of proof in establishing refugee status.
Petitioners sought to establish persecution on the basis of their membership in the
Fredys Lopez-Hernandez family. The IJ agreed that, for the purposes of refugee status,

1

The BIA had jurisdiction pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1. We have jurisdiction under
8 U.S.C. § 1252. Our standard of review of the BIA’s legal conclusions is de novo.
Escobar v. Gonzales, 417 F. 3d 363, 365 (3d Cir. 2005). Because the BIA adopted the
findings of the IJ and made additional findings, we will review the decisions of both the
BIA and the IJ. Escobar v. Gonzales, 417 F. 3d 363, 365 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Wang v.
Ashcroft, 368 F. 3d 347, 349 (3d Cir. 2004)).
2
8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(42)(A).
2

the “nuclear family of Fredys Lopez-Hernandez” qualifies as a particular social group.
But, the IJ correctly concluded that Petitioners did not qualify for asylum because they
failed to establish that a nexus between the social group and the alleged persecution. The
IJ determined that the alleged persecution was nothing more than generalized criminality
and violence.
In addition, none of the threats the Petitioners received resulted in physical harm.
Although a threat may constitute persecution, we have “refused to extend asylum
protection for threats that, while sinister and credible in nature, were not highly imminent
or concrete or failed to result in any physical violence or harm.” 3 Consequently, these
threats failed to rise to the level of persecution.

II.
For the same reasons that Petitioners’ proof failed to establish an asylum claim, it
also failed to support a claim that they qualify for withholding of removal. Substantial
evidence supports the IJ’s finding that the Petitioners failed to meet the burden for
withholding of removal. As discussed above, the testimony of the Petitioners undermines
their claims of persecution and refugee status.
III.
Finally, Petitioners have failed to make a credible claim for relief under the CAT.
Petitioners alleged persecutors were not government agents nor persons the government

Chavarrie v. Gonzalez, 446 F.3d 508, 518 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Li. V. Att’y Gen., 400
F3d 157, 164 (3d Cir. 2005)

3

3

was unwilling or unable to control. Petitioners’ own testimony established that they were
threatened to discourage them from reporting information concerning the Fredys LopezHernandez murder to law enforcement. That evidence not only failed to establish
government involvement or acquiescence, it showed exactly the opposite. The purported
perpetrators were concerned that the government would enforce the law and punish them
for their criminal conduct. As we have just noted, the fact that the threats were intended
to dissuade them from reporting criminal activity to the government undermines the
required proof that they will be tortured by the Honduran government or by persons
whom that government is unwilling, or unable to control.
For the foregoing reasons, we will dismiss the Petition for Review.
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